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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XVIII JANUARY 1930. Number 2.
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES IN KENTUCKY AND
THE RESTATEMENT.*
In view of the agitation all over the country for greater
certainty and clarity in the law, and in view of the further fact
that the American Law Institute has already assembled the doc-
trines of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts in final form
covering about one-half the whole subject matter, it becomes im-
portant for the lawyers of the various states to know how their
own courts stand with respect to the enunciations found in the
Restatement. This paper deals with only one chapter-namely,
"Third Party Beneficiary Contracts in Kentucky."'
The Kentucky decisions, like those in the majority of
American jurisdictions, recognize the right of the third party to
enforce the promise against the promisor. The Restatement
distinguishes three types of third party beneficiaries, viz. donee
or sole beneficiaries, obligee or creditor beneficiaries, and inci-
dental beneficiaries. Kentucky decisions make no specific classi-
fication, and where precedents are required, each of the first two
types are usually cited without distinction. It may be added
that in accord with See. 139 of the Restatement neither the bene-
ficiary in the donee type of cases.nor in the obligee type need be
identified at the time contract is executed. There are no very
clear cases of the first type illustrating this rule. General
promises to pay the creditors of the promisee; obligations of
water companies toward inhabitants where the former have con-
tracted with municipalities for the maintenance of water at
a certain pressure; the promise of a railroad company lessee to
its lessor to return the track leased in good condition, which
*Assistance from Mr. Richard Ballanger, a senior student in the
law school, in collecting the cases, is acknowledged.
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promise was construed to be, for the benefit of present and
future bondholders; in all these the beneficiaries were not identi-
fied when the contract was entered into. These cases are further
discussed below.
1. DONEE BENFICIARIES.
Although the third party may generally sue in Kentucky
under the circumstances mentioned in the Restatement as in
most other jurisdictions, still the Kentucky Court of Appeals
has on two occasions declared that in order for the beneficiary to
recover the promisee must owe a duty to such beneficiary.'
This declaration seems to imply that only the obligee and not
the donee beneficiary may sue. But inasmuch as the donee
beneficiary has recovered in other cases, 2 and further, since the
declaration is only dictum in these cases, much weight is not to
be attached to them.
Indeed, neither case involved a contract for third persons.
Thus Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Martin 3 was a garnishment
action. A, who had been injured by B, brought an action
against B for damages. After the death of B the case was tried
and judgment was recovered against B's administrator, and the
sheriff made levy of execution, and a return thereon, nulla bana.
B had an indemnity policy from C company, and the alleged
claim against C was garnisheed. It was held that until payment
I Spurrier et al. v. Burnett et al., 207 Ky. 736, 270 S. W. 25 (1925);
Fidelity & Casualty Company of 2ew York v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 173
S. W. 307. (1915).2 Mason v. Mason, 3 Bush (66 Ky.) 35 (1867); Clark v. McFarland's
Exrs., 5 Dana (35 Ky.) 45 (1827); MeGuire v. McGuire, 11 Bush (71
Ky.) 142 (1874); Benge v. Hiatt's Admr., 6 K. L. R. 714, (1885); A un-
day v. Munday, 21 K. L. R. 693, 52 S. W. 966 (1899); Townsend's As-
signee v. Townsend eta?., 127 Ky. 230, 105 S. W. 937 (1907); Griffin v.
Schlenck et al, 139 Ky. 523, 102 S. W. 837 (1907); Winn v. Schenck,
33 K. L. R. 615, 110 S. W. 827 (1908); Cumberland Tele. & Te~e. Co. v.
Cartwright Creek Tele. Co., 128 Ky. 395, 108 S. W. 875 (1908); Cf. Jen-
kins v. Morton, 3 T. B. Monroe 28 (Ky.) (1825); Mercer v. Mercer's
Admr., 87 Ky. 30, 7 S. W. 401 (1888). In Winn v. Schenck supra n. 2,
it 'was held that where a testator made a contract with A. to leave
property by will to B., and did so, B. took by virtue of the contract and
consequently no inheritance tax was payable by B, under Art. 19, C.
200 of the Act of 1906, now Sec. 4281 et al. Since this was a contract to
make a gift, it would seem to be beneficent and donative and there is
no sufficient reason why a gift of this kind should not be subject to
taxation. See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 198 (1921). In accord with principal
case is In re Schmol, 191 App. D. 435, 181 N. Y. Sup. 542, 230 N. Y.
559, 130 N. E. 893 (1920).
* Supra n.'1. Cf. Owens v. Georgia Life Ins. Co., 165 Ky. 507 (1915).
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was made by B's estate and until an actual loss had accrued,
the administrator had no claim against C. Then came the
dictum that A could not sue C because at the time when the
policy was procured B owed A no duty.
In the -other case, Spurrier v. Burnett 4 A had contracted
with a county and with the State Highway Commission for the
granting of a right of way for a highway. The Commission
thereupon had contracted with plaintiff for the construction of
the proposed highway. A interfered with plaintiff and would
not permit him to proceed, to his damage. After permitting no
recovery by plaintiff against A, the court again said that in
order for a third party beneficiary to recover on a contract made
for his benefit, the promisee must owe him a duty. It is evident
however, that this case belongs neither to the donee nor to the
obligee beneficiary type. It seems to answer the description in
the Restatement of the incidental beneficiary type who of course
acquired no rights under the contract.
In harmony with the theory of the right of the donee-bene-
ficiary to recover are the insurance cases which hold that the
beneficiary has a vested interest in the contract that cannot be
destroyed by act of the insured where he has not reserved power
in the policy to change the beneficiary named therein.5 If the
power has been so reserved the change may be made.6
Occasional statements are made that such beneficiary sues
because he is the real party in interest under the statute .7
There are, of course, two objections to this view. One is that the
"real party in interest" statute cannot properly be said to have
been intended to change the substantive law of contracts, but
was procedural only.8 Secondly, recovery was had in early
4 Supra n. 1. Of Ewell v. Best, 177 Ky. 673 (1917).5 Townsend v. Townsend, supra n. 2. Cf. Provident Savings Life
Assurance Society of New York v. Dees, 120 Ky. 285, 8-S. W. 522(1905).
4 Urice v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 572, 92 S. W. 560 (1906);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Kentucky v. Twyman et al., 122 Ky. 513, 92
S. W. 335 (1906); Hopkins v. Hopkins' Admr., 92 Ky. 324, 17 S. W.
864 (1891);Wirgman v. Miller, 98 Ky. 620, 33 S. W. 937 (1896), See
Williston on Contracts Sec. 396. '
49mith v. Smith, 5 Bush (Ky.) 625 (1869); Tyler v. Exchange
Bank of Kentucky, 9 K. L. R. 195 (1887) ; Paducah Lumber Co. v. Pa-
ducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, 12 S. W. 554 (1889).
"See Professor L. M. Simes' "Real Party in Interest Statute," 10
Ky. L. Jour. 60, (1922).
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donee-beneficiary cases long before the "real party in interest"
statute was enacted.
In Clark v. McFarland's Exrs.9 an early case, recovery was
allowed to an illegitimate child against its putative father on
a contract made for its benefit with its mother on the same
theory once followed in England, viz. by an identification for
the purpose of the suit, of the child with its parent.10 In an-
other case of promise to C to pay C and D where the considera-
tion moved from both C and D was regarded as a promise to
both on which C and D could sue jointly.1 ' But in still another
case where the promise was made to A and B for the benefit of
A, B, and C, C was allowed to recover and to sue as a joint
promisee, though no consideration seems to have moved from
him, and he was a donee beneficiary. 12
Occasionally the court finds it necessary to justify itself for
a departure from another English. doctrine, that consideration
should move from the plaintiff, and. it has several times declared
that the consideration may move from a third person.' 3
2. CRmDiTOr Bm\x'IcITA Es.
There are many cases in Kentucky where the obligee or
creditor beneficiary has been allowed to sue the promisor.
Particularly is this true where property has been conveyed to
the promisor in consideration of the payment of the grantor's
debts by him.' 4 Any other promise for the benefit of present
9 Supra n. 2.
10 See Dutton v. Poole, 2 Levinz 210 (K. B. 1677).
11Iucas v. Chamberlain, 8 B. Monroe (47 Ky. 276, 1848).
2Griffin v. Schenck, supra n. 2. In Oliver v. Gardner, 192 Ky. 89,
232 S. W. 418 (1921) a promise was made to the guardian of the step-
son by the promisor that compensation would be made to the stepson
of the promisor for services. Thus the consideration moved from the
third party beneficiary directly to the promisor, and no consideration
was given by the promisee.
:Farrow v. Turner, 2 A. K. Marsh. (9 Ky.) 495 (1820); Gregory v.
Harlan Home Coal Co., 182 Ky. 524, 206 S. W. 765 (1918); Whalen. v.
Judah, 5 K. L. R. 816 and 512 (1883); Paducah Lumber Co. V). Paducah
Water Supply Co., supra n. 7.
" Garvin & Company v. Mobley, 1 Bush (Ky.) 48 (1866); Davis,
Moody & Co. v. Wiley, 3 K. L. R. 815 (1881); Dodges Admr. v. Moss,
82 Ky. 441 (1884); First National Bank of Madison v. Solussler, 2 S.
W. (Ky.) 145 (1886); lforrison v. Payton, 81 K. L. R. 992, 104 S. W.
685 (1907); First National Bank v. Doherty, 156 Ky. 386, 161 S. W. 211
(1913); Williams v. Eagle Bank, 172 Ky. 541, 189 S. W. 883 (1916);
Bryant v. Jones, 183 Ky. 298, 209 S. W. 30 (1919).
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or future creditors is however, enforceable by such creditors.1 5
But in a case not officially reported 10 such a third party was
not permitted to recover, though no reason therefor was as-
signed.
The court has been troubled with this sort of a situation.
Suppose A mortgages a tract of land to B to secure a loan.
Later A conveys this equity of redemption to C, who promises
A to pay the mortgage debt to B. Still later C assigns his
interest to D who promises C to save C harmless from the
mortgage. Is this a promise to C for the benefit of creditors of
C? It was held in First Nationa Bank v. SchUssler 7 that the
mortgagee-third-party beneficiary could not recover from D,
though he could recover from C. The court felt that though a
third party beneficiary may sue, still a more remote person like
D was not liable. It may well be said that a promise to save C
harmless was not intended to benefit anyone save C, and that
there is no clear promise to pay the debt.' s
Harris v. Amos 19 is a peculiar case. It appears that A
owed B a sum of money and C owed A. Instead of entering
into a third party creditor-beneficiary contract whereby C
should promise to pay B instead of paying A, B promised C
that he would pay C's debt to A. Of course here was a contract
for the benefit of A instead of one for the benefit of B. B could
get a benefit out of it only if A should sue him on the debt due
from C, and then only by way of set-off. But A assigned his
claim against C to X. B went to X and took an assignment of
the note of C, giving his own to X as consideration for this
assignment. So far B, instead of obtaining any payment of the
A obligation, has incurred on his own part an obligation, and
has acquired a chose in action against X which he must reduce
to possession. At the time of the assignment of the C obligation
to B by X, X promised B that if he (X) should buy a certain
5Hall v. Alfort, 105 Ky. 664, 49 S. W. 444 (1899); Bowser v. Pat-
rickc, 23 K. L. R. 1578, 65 S. W. 824 (1901); Ballard v. American Hemp
Co., 30 K. L. R. 1080, 100 -. W. 271 (1907); Caldwel v. Ryan, 173 Ky.
233, 190 S. W. 1078 (1917). Cf. Henderson v. Haldeman, 14 S. W. 413
(1890).
1Springtown & Beechfork, Turnpike Road Co. v. Riley, 8 K. L. R
267 (1886).
"172 S. W. (Ky.) 145 (1886).
"See Restatement See. 141, illustration 4, page 168, and No. 144,
illustration 2, page 172.
" 22 Ky. 563 (2 T. B. Mon.) 1828.
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slave from A he would cancel B's note to himself (X), not that
he would pay A's debt to B. X did purchase the said. slave
from A but refused to cancel the B obligation, but instead sued
B and obtained judgment against the latter. In the principal
case B filed a bill to be relieved from the judgment. The court
held that in an action at law by X against B, B could not set-off
his claim against A, and that the promise of X to cancel the
claim against B if he bought the slave was nundum pactum. It
would clearly seem that the promise to cancel was conditional,
but clearly not nudum pactum. B's entire difficulty arose from
not understanding how an obligation for the benefit of third
persons is created.
(a) Beneficiaries Under Promises to the United States, A State
or a Municipality.
There are certain types of possible third party beneficiaries
which are usually not permitted to sue the promisor The Re-
statement see. 145 declares,
"Section 145. BENEFICIARIES UNDER PROMISES TO THE
UNITED STATES, A STATE OR A IUNICIPALITY.
"A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or-municipal-
ity by contract to do an act or reider a service to some or all of the
members of the public, is subject to no duty under the contract to such
members to give compensation for the injurious consequences of per-
forming or attempting to perform it, or of failing-to do so, unless,
"(a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in
the light of the circumstances surrounding its formation, that the
promisor shall compensate .inembers of the public for such injurious
consequences, or
"(b) the promisor's contract is with a municipality to render
services -the non-performance of which would subject the municipality
to a duty to pay damages to those injured thereby."
The reason why such contracts have been looked at differ-
ently from the others above considered, is that it was not evident
that such contracts were intended to benefit the citizens in their
individual capacity. It is difficult to classify the third parties
clearly either as donee or creditor beneficiaries and in fact in
some cases they more nearly resemble incidental than creditor
beneficiaries. Thus where franchises have been granted to
public utility companies, the latter to maintain their service to
inhabitants at a named rate, it has been held in Kentucky that
the consumer has no vested interest in the contract and the con-
tracting parties may change the rate without the consent of the
TniD PA&RTY BE'imcTAs
patrons of the utility.20 A former holding to the contrary is
definitely overruled.2
1
But Kentucky holds in conflict with the Restatement and
with most of the adjudicated cases elsewhere, that a water com-
pany, having contracted with a municipality to maintain water
at a certain pressure, is liable to the consumer if by virtue of a
breach of the contract the latter suffers a loss, i. e. if his prop-
erty is destroyed by fire in the event it could have been saved
if the contract had not been broken. 22 It is not believed that
these cases are covered by the provision in sec. 145(a).
In Cumberland Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Cartwright Tele. 0o.23
the defendant agreed with the municipality that in the case of
those persons for whom defendant had constructed no telephone
lines it would afford service if they offered telephone lines of
their own. It was properly held that such persons could sue
for a breach of the contract, since it is entirely clear that the
contract was made for their benefit.
(b) Official Bonds.
In a number 6Y cases where the occupant of certain posi-
tions or offices has been obliged by the requirements of the posi-
' Lutes v. Fayette Home TeZe. Co., 155 Ky. 555, 160 S. W. 179 (1913).
2 Louisville & T. Turnpike-Road Co. -v. Boss, 44 S. W. 981 (1898).
"Bates v. Foree, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 430 (1868); Duncan v. Owens-
boro, Water Co., 12 S. W. 557 (1889); See Owensboro Water Co. v. Dun-
can's Admr., 17 K. L. R. 755 (1895); Lexington Hydraulic d Mfg. Co.
v. Oots, 119 Ky. 598, 84 S. W. 774 (1905); Kenton 'Water Co. v. Glenn,
141 Ky. 529, 133 S. W. 573 (1911); Georgetown Water, etc., Co. v. Neale,
137 Ky. 197 (1911). In Phillips v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 266 Ky. 151,
266 S. W. 1064 (1924) it was held that a city which enters the com-
mercial field and agrees to furnish water to citizens individually apply-
ing therefor for fire protection, is liable for a breach of the contract
but is not liable for failure adequately to furnish public fire protection.
If it has contracted with a public utilities company for the supplying
of electricity to run its pumps and such company breaches its contract
and a resident is injured thereby, he cannot recover against such com-
pany since the contract was not made with the municipality for the
benefit of anyone other than the municipality.
In Hehorning v. Paducak Water Co., 230 Ky. 453 (Adv. sheets Oct.
24, 1929) a taxpayer alleged that sums of money had been improperly
collected by the water company under excessive rates charged, which
charge was in breach of an ordinance. The court held that the primary
right to sue was in the municipality and the taxpayer must show fail-
ure of the former to do its duty before being entitled to sue. Presum-
ably here, recovery was not claimed as due to the taxpayer individually
and hence the case is not bne involving 9 third party beneficiary. See
also, 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2nd. ed. 1928), Sec. 2590.
-'128 Ky. 395 (1908).
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tion or office. to give a bond to secure the proper performance of
his duties, such bond has been held to have been executed for the
benefit of third persons who had been adversely affected by fail-
ure of the principal on the bond. Thus a Master Commissioner
is liable on his bond (executed to the court) to the owner for
failing to pay over improperly collected rents ;24 the surety for
a circuit court clerk is similarly liable to a litigant for breach
of duty in failing to prepare a transcript ;25 a creditor of the
county may sue the surety on a sheriff's bond for failure of the
latter to pay a claim allowed by the Fiscal Court.26 In Owen
v. Baljard County Court27 it was said that the creditor only,
and not the Judge of the court, the promisee, could sue. An exe-
cution debtor may recover from the sheriff's bondsmen for fail-
ure of the sheriff to make due return after levy of the execution
and sale of the debtor's property;28 and a taxpayer may sue on
the bond of a county judge for breach of duty when the proper
official refuses to do so ;29 likewise, the State may recover on the
bond of one whose assignee commits a breach of contract entered
into between. the assignor and the prison commissioners for a
lease of the prison convicts.3 0
3. CO=WYv CE OP. A LbM TO A STRAGM,.
In at least three cases it has been held in Kentucky that in
a conveyance of land by A to B a lien may be reserved in favor
of C, who usually supplies to B the purchase money or a part
thereof. C may sue on the lien thus expressly reserved to him.31
This result is based by the court on the American doctrine that
a third party beneficiary to a contract may sue. The granting
of a legal lien however, transfers an interest in land and is con-
veyancory rather than promissory. Such a transfer is therefore
more nearly analogous to conveyances with reservations of rent
or of easements in favor of strangers. The common law did not
Tyler v. Exchange Bank of Kentuckc, 9 K. L. R. 195 (1887).
"Bates v. Foree, supra n. 22.
1 "Combs v. Crawford, 102 Ky. 462, 19 K. L. R. 1510, 43 S. W. 477
(1897). Cf. Hopins v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. 339 (1821).
71 Ky. 611 (1871).
"Rowland v. Wood, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 194 (1836).
"Commonwealth v. Tilton, 21 K. L. R. 1079, 54 S. W. 11 (1899).-
"Albin Co. v. commonwealth, 128 Ky. 295, 108 S. W. 299 (1908).
'Mize v. Barnes, 78 Ky. 506 (1880); Powells ,Admr. v. Minor,
Dixon & Co.,,11 K. L. R. 286 (1889); Blaleley and wife v. Adams, 113
Ky. 392, 68 -S. W. 393 (1902).
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permit the stranger to assert any right arising from such a reser-
vation, and various reasons have been assigned therefor 2 The
Kentucky Court has followed the common law in this respect.33
As Tiffany points out however,3 4 there is no sufficient reason
why a grantor may not by one' and the same instrument convey
land to one person and an easement therein to another. He in-
dicates that there is some authority for this view. On this
theory the reservation of a lien in favor of a stranger seems
entirely sound, but the principle is not analogous to contracts
for the benefit of third persons.
4. WHO MAY SuE FOR A BREACH OF THE CONTRACT ?
(a) The Promisee Hay Sue.
As to the right to sue, the Restatement provides in sec. 135
as follows:
"Section 135. A GIFT PROMISE CREATES A DUTY BOTH TO
THE DONEE BENEFICIARY AND TO THE PROMISEE.
"Except as stated in Section 140,
"(a) a gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the promisor
to the donee beneficiary to perform the promise; and the duty can be
enforced by the donee beneficiary for his own benefit;
"(b) a gift promise also creates a duty of the promisor to the
promisee to render the promised performance -to -the donee beneficiary."
Section 136 reads:
"A PROMISE TO DISCHARGE A DUTY CREATES A DUTY
BOTH TO THE CREDITOR BENEFICIARY AND TO THE PROW-
ISEE. EXTENT OF THESE DUTIES.
"(1) Except as stated in Sections 140 and 143,
"(a) a promise to discharge the promisee's duty created a duty
of the promisor to the creditor beneficiary to perform the promise;
"(b) a promise to discharge the promisee's duty creates also a
duty to the promisee;
"(c) whole or partial satisfaction of the promisor's duty to the
creditor beneficiary satisfies to that extent the promisor's duty to the
promisee;
"(d) Whole or partial satisfaction of the promisor's duty to the
promisee in any other way than by rendering the promised perform-
822 Tiffany on Real Property (2nd ed. 1920) p. 1610.
w.Beinlein v. Johns, 102 Ky. 570, 44 S. W. 128 (1898). Though this
appears to be dictum, still the court assumes the principle to be well
recognized. The reason for the common law rule is declared to be that
a reservation was regarded as the equivalent of a grant back which in
the earlier period was accomplished by an indenture as the conveying
instrument. Later a deed poll was regarded as the equivalent of an
indenture, but it could not be regarded as a grant to a stranger.
31 See note 32, op. eit. p. 1611.
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ance in whole or in part does not limit the promisor's duty to the
creditor beneficiary.
"(2) Whether the extent of the promisor's duty to the creditor
beneficiary is measured by the promisee's actual, supposed or asserted
duty to the beneficiary at the time of the making of -the contract, or at
some other time, depends upon the interpretation of the promise."
How do the Kentucky cases hold? The court has not
always realized the difference between a contract for the benefit
of a third person, and property rights resulting from a contract,
and rights arising from revocable agencies 35 and has treated
their rights as if the problem were one of third party benefi-
ciaries. Thus in Allen v. Thomas 3 6 A, who desired to send a
sum of money to B in Nicaragua (whether as a gift or because
of an obligation is not clear) placed the funds in the hands of
C to be delivered to B. B died before C reached Nicaragua and
thereafter A sued for the recovery of the sum. It was held that
this was a contract for the benefit of a third. person and the
promisee could not sue on it after the death of the beneficiary.
The cause of action was held to be in B's representative only.
This type of case seems to be a revocable agency (though a trust
might conceivably have been created) and the principal should
have recovered the deposit. So in S'mith v. Lewis 37 a common
carrier covenanted with the shipper to deliver certain goods to
the consignee thereof. The court felt that the shipper could not
sue for breach of covenant in failing to deliver to the consignee,
saying that there was no real promise to the shipper, but holding
in effect that not the promisee on such a contract has a cause
of action, but rather the beneficiary. Professor Williston has
pointed out that the consignee in such contracts may sue but
not because he is the beneficiary of a contract made for his bene-
fit, but rather because he had become the purchaser and was at
the time of the breach the owner of the goods.38
In Kentucky, as in other jurisdictions, it has not always
been clear just what the rights of the promisee and of the bene-
ficiary were, whether or not they existed side by side and
"Williston on Contracts, Sec. 384-352.
"3 Met. (60 Ky. 1860) 198; but the contrary was held in Bpalding
v. Henshaw, 80 Ky. 55, 3 K. L. R. 557 (1882) where A, owing B, handed
the amount of the debt to C, the surety, to be delivered to B. Later A
sued C for failure to pay B and it was held that A had the right to
countermand the commission and recall the funds at pleasure at any
time before the funds came to C.
8742 Ky. 229 (3 B. Mon. 1842).
3Williston on Contracts, Sec. 348.
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whether each was to be allowed a remedy. Conversely, it was
difficult to conclude logically that the promisor should be sub-
ject to two suits, one by each of these parties. As a conse-
quence it has been occasionally held that the promisee could not
sue.
3 9
In Jenkins and Wife v. Morton40 for a breach of covenant
to H to pay H and his wife W the dividends from certain
shares of stock, it was held that H should sue alone, and there
was a misjoinder where H and W joined as plaintiffs. The
wife was improperly joined because the action of covenant lies
only in the name of the covenantee, though the wife was named
in the covenant as one of the payees. In other cases however,
the right of the promisee also to sue has been recognized.41 In
Mills v. Sti~lwelU42 when the promisee brought an action against
the promisor for a breach, it was held that the defense that
promisee contracted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal
was not maintainable.
(b.) The Beneficiary May Sue.
We are entirely familiar with the rule that the beneficiary
may sue. Illustrations of this are to be found throughout the
cases cited- above dealing with donee-boneficiaries and obligee-
beneficiaries. In see. 138 of the Restatement the remedy by
way of specific performance is provided for the beneficiary.
An illustration in Kentucky is found in McGuire v. McGuire 4
3
where specific performance of a contract or the equivalent
thereof was granted to the beneficiary where a promisor under
an obligation to give property by will to plaintiff made another
disposition of the same.
10 Owens v. BallardZ County Court, 71 Ky. 611 (1871).
'03 T. B. Monroe 28 (Ky. 1825).
UaMcOlure v. Bigstaff, 18 K. L. R. 601, 37 S. W. 294 (1896); Balard
v. American Hemp Co., 30 K. L. R. 1080, 100 S. W. 271 (1907); Trustees
of Perryvlle v. Letcher, 1 T. B. Monroe 11 (17 Ky. 1824).
'28 K. L. R. 204, 89 S. W. 112 (1905).
- 1 Bush. (74 Ky.) 142 (1874) ; see also Smith v. Smith, supra n. 7;
Mason v. Mason, 3 Bush (66 Ky. 35) (1867); also see dictum in
Powell's Admr. v. Minor, Dixon & Co., supra n. 31, and Mize v. Barnes,
supra n. 31.
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5. DwENSES, SET-OrF, RELFA SE AND REFORmAON.
Section 140 reads as follows:
"DEFENSES OF THE PROMISOR AGAINST THE PROMISEE
ARE AVAILABLE AGAINST A BENEFICIARY.
"There can be no donee beneficiary or creditor beneficiary unless a
contract has been formed between a promisor and promisee; and if a
a contract is conditional, voidable, or unenforceable at the time of its
formation, or subsequently ceases to be binding in whole or in part
because of impossibility, illegality or the present or prospective failure
of the promisee to perform a return promise which was the considera-
tion for the promisor's promise, the right of a donee beneficiary or
creditor beneficiary under the contract is subject to the same limita-
tion."
Thus in a life insurance policy where the right to change
the beneficiary is reserved and the insured makes such a change,
the former beneficiary has no right to complain because of the
change.44
The ,problem of the privilege of the promisor to set-off a
claim he has against the promisee when he is sued by thb bene-
ficiary ;45 whether, the promisee in a creditor beneficiary type of
contract may recover such sum as he may by mistake have over-
paid such beneficiary;46 and whether the promisee may release
the promisor from his obligation to the beneficiary 47 have arisen
in Kentucky.
Sec. 140 pretty clearly does not apply to the privilege as-
serted by a defendant when sued by a third party beneficiary,
to set off against such beneficiary a claim he may hold against
the promisee. There seems to be no section in the Restatement
applying to such a problem. In case of set-off the contract does
not cease to be binding. The promisor is bound to the third
party for the reason that he has consented to be bound and the
third party's right should not be trimmed down by an offset
against the promisee. In one case not officially reported 48 this
privilege was granted to the promisor. No theory is set out
whether "asset" theory or otherwise indicating the rationale
Crice v. Illinois Life Ins. GJo.. and Mutual Life Ins. (o. v. Twyman,
supra n. 6; Hopkins v. Hopkins' Admr., and Wirgman v. Miller, supra
n. 6. Cf. Townsend v. Townsend, supra n. 2, and Provident Savings
Life Assurance Society of New York v. Dees, supra n. 5.
-5W ha~len v. Judah, supra n. 13
1" Morrison v. Payton, supra n. 14.4 Dodge's Admnr. v. Moss, supra n. 14. See Section No. 143 of the
Restatement.
Whallen v. Judah, supra n. 45.
of the decision. The court holds that the promisor may set off a
claim he holds against the promisee if he has those claims be-
fore he receives notice from the beneficiary that the latter
accepts the benefit of the contract. The burden of showing the
giving of such notice was said to be on the beneficiary. In an-
other case it was correctly held that if A, B, and C are sued on
a joint and several obligation, B and C cannot set off a claim
held by A against the plaintiff.49 In one case a right of set-off
was denied.30 The C. & 0. Railroad leased its unfinished track
to the L. & C. Railroad Company (which assigned to the L. &
N. Railroad Company). It also executed bonds secured by a
deed of trust and handed them over to the lessee for sale to pro-
cure funds to complete the track. The lessee inter alia agreed
to restore the track at the termination of the lease in good re-
pair, but failed so to do. In an action by the trustee for the
benefit of the bondholders, the defendant lessee sought to set-off
the debt of the lessor to the lessee accruing after the execution
of the agreement, and it was held that such set-off as against
bondholders could not be allowed.
Where A conveys mortgaged property to B, and B by mis-
take takes upon himself the personal obligation to pay the debt,
it has been held that A and B may reform the agreement with-
out the consent of the mortgagee, by making him a party.
5 1
Where A promised B, a contractor, that he would pay all the-
bills incurred by B in building a house for A, and A inad-
vertently paid to a material man more than his entire debt due
to B under the contract, it was held that there was in fact no
overpayment as the contract was broad enough to bind A to
pay the entire claim.52 However, it is presumed that there
would be no difficulty on principle about a recovery if the con-
tract did not call for the payment of the entire sum paid.
May the promisee release the promisor to the disadvantage
of the beneficiary? No, says the Restatement see. 142, if the
contract is of the donee-beneficiary type. But a different rule
prevails in the obligee-benefieiary type. Section 143 reads:
"A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a contract or a
variation thereof by them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if,
U0 Cardwef v. Atwater, 15 K. L. R. 570 (1894).
' Morrison v. Payton, supra n. 14
"Jones v. Higgins, 80 Ky. 409 (1882).
" Dodge's Admr. v. Moss, supra n. 14.
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(a) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit upon the
promise or otherwise materially change his position in reliance
thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation, and
(b) the promisee's action is not 4 fraud on creditors."
In Dodge's Adm r. v. Moss53 A owed various persons. In
consideration of B's promise to pay A's debts, A made a con-
veyance to B. Later for a consideration A purported to release
B from the obligation. It was held that the release was ineffec-
tive as to creditors. Thus Kentucky seems to apply to creditor
beneficiary contracts the rule which, according to the Restate-
ment, belongs only to the donee type unless it be that the case
comes under see. 143(b).
Finally, as is provided in the Restatement see. 147, the in-
cidental beneficiary in general acquires no right of action.
Cases illustrating this have already been referred to.54
CoNcLUsIoNs:
There has not been experienced in Kentucky the same diffi-
culty with respect to the enforcement by the beneficiary of third
party contracts as has been found in many jurisdictions. Little
distinction however, has been observed between cases where the
beneficiary had a claim against the promisee and where he had
none. One type of case has frequently been cited as a precedent
when the facts showed that the other situation was present. In
a very few cases the Court of Appeals has held that in order for
the contract to be enforceable the promisee must owe the bene-
ficiary a duty. Again, not always has the court distinguished
between rights arising from such contract and those resulting
from a transfer of property, from revocable agencies, and liens
granted to strangers in the conveyances of land. Occasionally
also, &, wrong reason is given, viz., that the beneficiary is the real
party in interest, which would imply that he only could sue on
the contract.
There has been no substantial difficulty in Kentucky with
reference to recovery by the creditor beneficiary, not only where
he is a mortgagee beneficiary, or is a conditional devisee, or is
the beneficiary of a promise made by the purchaser of a busi-
ness for the benefit of the seller's creditors; or is a beneficiary
of contractors' surety bonds, but also in other cases. Indeed,
13Supra n. 53.
14 See cases cited in notes 3 and 4, and perhaps also those in note 22.
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he is allowed recovery on contracts made by water companies
with municipalities where a certain pressure has been promised,
which doctrine is in conflict with the great weight of authority,
and -with the Restatement.
As to the right of action for breach of the contract our
cases in general agree with the Restatement that an action for
breach of the contract lies in favor of both the promisee and the
beneficiary, and that defenses good against the promisee are at
least generally good against the beneficiary. With respect to
set-off, our court has held in the creditor beneficiary type of
case that the promisor may, when sued by the beneficiary, set a
claim he holds against the promisee off against the benefieiary's
claim; but such privilege is not granted if the set-off arises
after the date of the contract, or if it does arise later than the
date of the contract it is not available if asserted after the bene-
ficiary has signified his intention to take advantage of his rights
under the contract. In a few cases the promisee has not been
allowed ail action, but that view has been abandoned. On the
whole, the cases are not very far from an accord with the Re-
statement. The court is in a favorable position as respects prec-
edents and local statutes for following the principles of the Re-
statement, except in the water company cases.
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